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NOTES
we can appraise the results of the broadened test of criminal responsibility,
which we recently announced in Durham."
114
While the Durham rule may not, upon subsequent examination, p rove
to be the solution to the complex problem of criminal responsibility, it is a
tangible solution in an area where the law has long been criticized for
inertia.11 By realistically emphasizing greater freedom for psychiatric
testimony, the ethical-legal role of the judge in instructing, and the moral
duty of the jury to balance legal principle with medical fact, the Durham
approach represents a forward step from the present legal tests.
PROPOSAL FOR APPORTIONMENT OF THE FEDERAL
ESTATE TAX
The failure of Congress to specifically provide who shall ultimately
bear the burden of the federal estate tax has resulted in much litigation,
many attempts at remedial legislation, and general confusion on the matter
among the states. A need clearly exists for positive action to alleviate
the problems created by the void in the present estate tax structure, and
an analysis of the history and purpose of the federal act and of various
state attempts to interpret Congressional silence on the allocation of the
tax burden should reveal what measures are required.
The federal estate tax purports to be an excise on the transfer of
property resulting from death.' The definition of the taxable estate, how-
ever, includes interests which do not even pass through the executor's
hands in his administration of the estate-interests which are not ordi-
narily considered as part of the "true estate". 2  This is one reason why
114. Stewart v. United States, 214 F.2d 879, 883 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The Stewart
case, surprisingly enough, involved a felony (robbery)-murder situation, which might
complicate the concept of diminished responsibility, at least in regard to the intent in-
volved for the murder, none being required. However, the amicis thought that the doc-
trine would still be applicable to the intent required for the felony. See Brief for Abraham
Chayes as Amicus Curiae, supra note 112, at 42-46.
115. It is significant that an important jurisdiction like the District of Columbia,
where many famous insanity cases have arisen, is willing to serve as a pilot area for this
approach to the problem.
1. The converse of an inheritance tax, it is a charge on the entire estate, to be paid
prior to distribution. 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAXATION § 1.05 (1942 ed.).
2. The definition includes all real or personal property, tangible or intangible where-
ever situated, except real property outside of the United States, to the extent of the in-
terest of decedent therein at death, or more specifically: corporate stock; dower; cur-
tesy; or statutory interests of surviving spouses; transfers, in trust or otherwise, in con-
templation of death; transfers with a retained life estate; transfers taking effect at death;
revocable transfers; annuities; joint interests; appointive property; life insurance pro-
ceeds; and transfers for insufficient consideration. See INT. Rxv. CODE §§ 2031, 2033-
2044. See the definition of "legal estate" in Indiana, note 43 infra.
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it is difficult to accept the proposition that, in the absence of contrary
direction in the will, the federal estate tax is to be borne by the residuary
estate in the same manner as ordinary debts, funeral and administration
expenses of a "true estate".!
Taken as a whole, the federal act is ambiguous on the question of
who is to bear the ultimate burden of the tax. The Code provides that
the executor shall pay the tax, prior to distribution if possible, and that
unless the decedent directs otherwise in his will, the executor shall be
entitled to a pro-rated reimbursement from beneficiaries of life insurance
and from persons receiving property through a power of appointment.'
The Code introduces a possible conflict, however, by providing that any
person paying the tax from property distributed to him shall be entitled to
reimbursement.' Except for these provisions, the Code is silent as to the
tax incidence. The judiciary and writers on the problem have interpreted
this silence to indicate the Federal Government's indifference as to who
should ultimately bear the tax.' In light of the legislative history of the
Act such an interpretation is dubious.
At the time of the passage of the present act, it is conceivable that
Congress was not much concerned with the equities involved in the ques-
tion of who should bear the burden. There was no suggestion that the
tax was to be permanent, but rather that it was for purely emergency
3. This proposition is urged in Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N.E. 114
(1922), aff'd, 246 U.S. 47 (1924). See also Matter of Hamlin, 226 N.Y. 407, 124 N.E.
4 (1919), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 672 (1919).
4. INT. REV. CODE §§ 2002, 2205, 2206, 2207.
5. The recipient of the property from which the tax was paid may obtain reimburse-
ment from ". . . any part of the estate still undistributed or . . . the persons whose in-
terest in the estate of the decedent would have been reduced if the tax had been paid be-
fore the distribution of the estate or whose interest is subject to equal or prior liability
for the payment of taxes. . . ." INT. REV. CODE § 2205.
The inter-relationship of §§ 2205, 2206, and 2207 can be explained so as not to be in-
consistent with one another. Section 2205 does not suggest that the tax is to be paid out
of the residuary estate. Construed with either § 2206 or § 2207, § 2205 could feasibly
mean that the distributee who paid the total tax is entitled to reimbursement only for that
portion of the tax not attributable to his share of the taxable estate. See Riggs v. Del
Drago, 317 U.S. 95, 101 (1942).
It also might be argued that since Congress specified that the executor is to pay the
tax and since he controls the estate prior to distribution, Congress impliedly meant for
him to deduct a pro-rata share from each interest before distribution. This implication
might arise when it is noted that Congress felt it necessary to provide expressly for
proration from insurance beneficiaries and recipients of appointive property who are
necessarily outside the executor's scope of administration.
6. See Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942) ; Note, 3 WSTEN RESERVE L. REV.
164, 168-169 (1951).
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wartime purposes.' As a means of raising revenue, an estate tax had a
distinct advantage over other types of death taxes.' When it enacted the
law in 1916, Congress may well have intended the tax to be paid out of
the residue as the provision giving distributees who paid the tax a right to
reimbursement9 wits uncontroverted by any provision affording the ex-
ecutor a similar right."0 Since the tax attached to the estate prior to distri-
bution, obviously it attached to and was to be paid out of the whole estate.
It was subject to the same treatment as any other debt of the decedent,
and the fact that residuary legatees might receive less because of the
statute seemed of little consequence." It was unlikely that undue hard-
ship could result from Congress' lack of concern at that time as the rates
were comparatively low,'" and even if the burden of the entire tax was
borne by a particular fund of the estate, there was, as a rule, no pro-
nounced mutilation of the testator's scheme."
By 1918, Congress had ceased considering the estate tax in terms
of temporary war purposes; instead it talked in terms of equities.' 4 In
7. Historically, the Federal Government had entered the death tax field for tem-
porary war purposes only. The first death duty in the United States was a stamp tax
on receipts for legacies and shares of personal property (1797-1802). During the Civil
War, legacy, probate, and succession duties had been levied but were repealed in 1872.
A legacy tax on personal property during the Spanish-American War was repealed in
1902. 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 1, § 1.02. The necessity for 1916 legislation grew out
of ". . . the extraordinary increase in the appropriations for the Army and Navy and
the fortification of our country." H.R. REP. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1916).
It was generally recognized that the states had pre-empted the field. "The merit of
the claim of the States to a prior right to levy death taxes is well-recognized. The
States control the transfer of property and have the ultimate title to privately-owned
land and other private property. It is under State law that property at the death passes
from the deceased to the heir, and it is to the State that the property reverts in case
there is no heir." Burr, Federal-State Fiscal Relations, 21 PA. B. A. Q. 160, 164 (1950).
But see Reports to the JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE, Taxation, 2 FED-
ERAL & STATE DEATH TAXES, pt. 2, pp. 142-143 (1933) where it is stated that as early as
1912, agitation for federal entry into the death tax field had begun. Theodore Roosevelt
and Andrew Carnegie led the movement sparked by a "social motive" of cutting down
enormous fortunes which were transferred at death.
8. "The Federal estate tax . . . can be readily administered with less conflict than
a tax based upon the shares." H.R. REP. No. 922, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1916).
9. I T. REv. CODE § 2205.
10. The executor has a similar right in the present act; see INT. REV. CODE §§ 2206,
2207.
11. See New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349-350 (1921).
12. The rates of the 1916 Act were from 1 percent to 10 percent. Revenue Act of
1916, § 201, 39 STAT. 777 (1916).
13. This situation has been drastically altered by a tremendous increase in rates.
Today, for instance, possibly 50 percent or more of the estate could be carved out for
payment of the federal estate tax. See 1 PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE & GIFT TAXATION §
13.54 (1946 Supp.).
14. "Minor changes . . . have been made for the sake of insuring more equitable
. . . administration of the law . . . the giving to the executor a right of contribution
from the specific beneficiary under policies of insurance." H.R. REP. No. 767, 65th
Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1918). It is significant that the 1919 act had also raised the top
rate to 25 percent. Revenue Act of 1919 § 401, 40 STAT. 1096 (1919).
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drafting the revenue bill of 1918, the Senate Finance Committee went so
far as to substitute an inheritance tax. The Committee voiced its objec-
tions to rates imposed without regard for the amount of shares of in-
dividual legatees or heirs and concluded that the inheritance tax plan was
fairer in its operation than the estate tax plan.1" The fact that the provi-
sions for including life insurance proceeds in the estate for tax purposes
and for entitling the executor to be reimbursed by insurance beneficiaries
were both passed in that year seems further indication that Congress was
becoming interested in incorporating within the estate tax program the
equitable features of the inheritance tax. 6 While the Federal Government
has never sanctioned an inheritance tax, it has, during the thirty-eight
year operation of the estate tax, adopted other characteristics of such a
tax. In 1942, a subsection was incorporated allowing the executor to
recover from recipients of appointive property the portion of the tax
allocable to such property." The Revenue Act of 1948 provided for the
marital deduction, and although the chief purpose of this provision may
have been to extend to married persons of all states the tax benefits of
the community property system,"8 it is manifest that the allowance also
lessens the burden of the estate tax where a surviving spouse is involved. 9
A study of the revenue figures compiled during the history of the tax
points up also the diminishing significance of the estate tax as a means
for raising money.2" The estate tax has apparently become primarily an
15. SEN. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. 15 (1918).
16. This section was adopted in the Revenue Act of 1919 § 408, 40 STAT. 1100
(1919).
17. "The purpose of this [sub-section] is to achieve a fair and equitable apportion-
ment of the tax burden attributable in part to appointive property. [The] technical
change in this provision [was made] to coordinate it with [sub-] section 826 (c) relating
to the liability of life insurance beneficiaries. . . " SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d
Sess. 233-234 (1942).
18. The benefits result from the ownership by each spouse of one-half the com-
munity property. TRACHTMAN, ESTATE PLANNING 12 (Prac. Law Institute, 1950 ed.).
19. It is submitted that the particular provision was another expression of Con-
gressional intent to make the tax more equitable. Note infra at pp. 232-234 the varying
interpretations of the provision.
20. For instance, in 1923 almost five percent of the federal taxes were derived from
death duties, but by 1931 only 1.7 percent came from this source. REPORTS TO THE JOINT
COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 12. While the revenue from
the estate tax increased from .4 billion dollars in 1939 to .8 billion in 1949, its percentage
of the total revenue dropped five percent in the same period. Hearings before Commonittee
on Ways and Means on Revenue Revision of i95o, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., Chart 6, facing
p. 45 (1950).
"The combined revenues of the two taxes [gift and estate] furnish only an insignifi-
cant contribution to the federal revenues. There is ample evidence to support the con-
clusion that Congress continues to exploit those fields, not to raise revenue, but to further
its social ideas as to the redistribution of wealth." Browne, Federal-State Tax Co-
ordination, 31 CORNELL L.Q. 182, 201-202 (1945). According to Joseph J. O'Connel Jr.,
former General Counsel of the Treasury Department, the combined estate and gift tax
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instrument for prevention of the accumulation of wealth at death and
must be appraised as such.2
As Congress looked more and more to the estate tax as a permanent
scheme for social regulation, it should have become increasingly con-
cerned with the question of who pays the tax rather than how much
revenue is to be realized. If the decedent is allowed to specify the fund
out of which the tax is to be paid, the efforts of Congress to control the
aggregation of wealth will be thwarted.22 In addition, when a will is
silent on the matter of who shall be ultimately responsible for payment, or
when there is no will, not only is serious harm likely to result to the close
relatives of the decedent; but also certain beneficiaries and specific lega-
tees may again avoid the tax's pressures for social readjustment. For,
while Congress protects the residuary estate against inequitable depletion
through payment of the tax on life insurance proceeds and on appointive
property, it remains apathetic toward the residuary's interest in allowing
others to escape the tax burden where they take under a will having no
provision for apportionment, through a transfer in trust, or as surviving
tenants of an estate held jointly or by the entirety. A matter of further
concern is Congressional silence as to whether the marital deduction pro-
vision is to benefit the surviving spouse alone or the entire estate.2" It is
difficult to understand the legislative purpose in leaving to the several
states the determination of the ultimate burden of the tax with only those
exceptions mentioned above." Nevertheless, presently the burden of the
yield is less than the yield of cigarette taxes alone. Osgood, Repeal the Federal Estate
Tax, 84 TRUSTS & ESTATES 246, 248 (1947).
21. Certainly a 1933 Joint Congressional Committee recognized that it was no
longer the purpose of the estate tax to raise revenue for the Federal Government, but
rather (1) to prevent concentration and perpetuation of large fortunes in the hands of
those who contribute nothing to the creation of them, (2) to prevent recipients from
living idly and unproductively off the wealth of another, and (3) to alleviate to a degree
the bad social aspects involved in allowing the recipients to command the labor and
services of others who did not have the good fortune of having rich ancestors. See
REPORTS TO THE JOINT COAMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 144-
145. It is noteworthy also that the committee spoke in terms of "recipients of property"
while the estate tax goes under the guise of being a tax on the transmission of property,
i.e., a tax against decedent. Ibid.
22. Certain recipients of testamentary property are allowed to receive relatively
large amounts and thereby circumvent the purposes of the estate tax outlined in note 21
supra. In other words, although the total estate of testator may be diluted by the federal
estate tax, the testator still may set aside a fund for payment of the tax and thereby in-
sulate whomever he chooses from some of the social results sought by Congress.
The decedent may have been able to accomplish the same thing through creation of
effective trusts. See Hearings, supra note 20, at 75, 79, 82.
23. The provision allows a deduction up to one-half the value of the adjusted gross
estate for any interest in property which passes or has passed from the decedent to his
surviving spouse. See INT. REv. CODE § 2056.
24. Randolph Paul points out this seeming lack of reason: "At the present time
there is no provision apportioning the estate tax liability among the beneficiaries of the
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
federal estate tax is dependent entirely on the jurisdiction2 ' and the type
of property involved.26  The result has not been satisfactory.
During the initial operation of the federal estate tax law, courts
generally held that unless a will directed otherwise, the residuary estate
should free specific bequests from the tax. The first important decision
on the matter was In re Hamlin7 in which the burden-on-the-residue prin-
ciple was extended to non-testamentary and nbn-probate property. With
the exception of Kentucky, Florida, and perhaps New Hampshire,"s the
Hamlin decision was followed in principle in every state in which the issue
arose for over twenty years. 9 Had not a New York Commission to In-
vestigate Defects in the Laws of Estates become dissatisfied with the
inequitable effects of the rule," the burden-on-the-residue principle might
well have become settled law in most jurisdictions. The Commission
estate other than a provision relating to life insurance. [This statement by Mr. Paul
was made prior to adoption of the provision requiring reimbursement from recipients of
appointive property.] There is no sound basis for having an express provision appor-
tioning liability in regard to life insurance without similar provisions covering other
transfers subject to the estate tax. It is therefore suggested that there be incorporated
in the estate tax an apportionment provision which would apportion the liability for tax
in those cases in which the decedent did not himself prescribe a method of apportion-
ment." Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 94 (1942).
There is a question as to whether the power given the executor to proceed against
insurance beneficiaries and recipients of appointive property is permissive or mandatory.
Alabama relieves the executor of any duty to so proceed. ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 449 (Supp.
1953). Yet the Indiana court construes the federal statute as imposing a duty upon,
rather than creating a power in, the representative to recover the taxes paid. Pearcy v.
Citizens Bank and Trust Co. of Bloomington, 121 Ind. App. 136, 96 N.E.2d 918 (1951).
See also CCH FED. EST. & GiFT TAx REP. ,1 3140.05 (1952).
25. The placing of the burden depends on whether a state follows the common law
burden-on-the-residue rule or has judicially sanctioned equitable apportionment or has
enacted an apportionment statute of its own.
26. It is relevant to consider whether it is testamentary property, intestate property,
or property included in decedent's estate solely for purposes of the federal estate tax.
27. 226 N.Y. 407, 124 N.E. 4 (1919), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 672 (1919).
28. See Hampton's Administrators v. Hampton, 188 Ky. 199, 221 S.W. 496 (1920)
decreeing that the tax should be apportioned between the realty and the personalty, and
Henderson v. Usher, 125 Fla. 709, 170 So. 846 (1936) where the dower interest of a
widow was charged with its portion of the estate tax. The first case to arise anywhere
on the question of apportionment was Fuller v. Gale, 78 N.H. 544, 103 Atl. 308 (1918)
where proration was allowed. This holding was reversed, however, in Amoskeag Trust
Co. v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 89 N.H. 471, 200 Atl. 786 (1938).
29. See Thompson v. Union and Mercantile Trust Co., 164 Ark. 411, 262 S.W. 324
(1924) ; Erickson v. Childs, 124 Conn. 66, 198 Atl. 176 (1938) ; Hepburn v. Winthrop, 65
App. D. C. 309, 83 F.2d 566 (1936) ; Brown's Estate v. Hoge, 198 Ia. 373, 199 N.W. 320
(1924) ; Central Trust Co. v. Burrow, 144 Kan. 79, 58 P.2d 469 (1936) ; Plunkett v. Old
Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471, 124 N.E. 265 (1919) ; In re Holmes Estate, 328 Mo.
143, 40 S.W.2d 616 (1931) ; Commercial Trust Co. of New Jersey v. Millard, 122 N.J. Eq.
290, 193 Atl. 814 (1937); Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N.E. 114 (1922),
aff'd, 264 U.S. 47 (1924) ; Ely's Estate, 28 Pa. D. & C. 663 (Orphans Ct. 1936). Cf. In re
Will of Kootz, 228 Wis. 306, 280 N.W. 672 (1938) ; People v. Northern Trust Co., 289
Ill. 475, 124 N.E. 662 (1919).
30. See N.Y. LEGiS. Doc. No. 69, at p. 226 (1930).
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sought and obtained passage of the first apportionment statute which
provided, in effect, that in absence of contrary testamentary direction,
the burden of estate taxes was to be equitably prorated among the distri-
butees of property required to be included for tax purposes in the estate
of the decedent. 1
Primarily because of the doubtful constitutionality of the statute, the
states were hesitant to follow New York's leadership.32 In spite of a
judicially recognized "reasonableness" of the law, 3 only two jurisdictions
enacted a similar act during the following decade.34 Not until the United
States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the New York
approach in Riggs v. Del Drago3" was there significant change in judicial
and legislative disposition toward apportionment.
The effects of the Del Drago decision on other jurisdictions have
been manifold. Some states have apparently shifted from the burden-on-
the-residue to the equitable apportionment rule solely through court deci-
sion." Many have enacted statutes similar to that of New York,3" and
31. N.Y. DECEDENT'S ESTATE LAW § 124.
32. For other possible reasons, see p. 228 infra.
33. "[A]ppellants say that . . . the residue consists of both real and personal
property, and that each should bear its share of the burden. There is a reasonableness to
this which Congress might very well have considered, but we think the answer is that
Congress left the question open to action either by the testator in the will or by the states
through statute." (Emphasis added.) Hepburn v. Winthrop, 83 F.2d 566, 572 (D.C.
Cir. 1936).
34. Maryland and Pennsylvania. See MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 81, § 161
(1951) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 844 (1950), repealed 1951, Aug. 24, P.L. 1405, § 8 and
superceded by §§ 881-887 (Supp. 1953).
35. 317 U.S. 95 (1942).
36. "The general rule . . . apparently developed during a period in which many
courts construed the federal estate tax statutes as evidencing the intent of Congress to
cast the burden of the tax upon the residuary estate, but later the Supreme Court held
in Riggs v. Del Drago . . . that 'Congress intended that state law should determine the
ultimate thrust of the tax.'" Carpenter v. Carpenter, 267 S.W.2d 632, 641 (Mo. 1954).
"It is our conclusion that the federal estate tax should be prorated . . . and that the
beneficiaries of the annuity should pay the tax attributable to their respective interests
therein." Id. at 642. Compare this holding with It re Holmes Estate, 328 Mo. 143, 40
S.W.2d 616 (1931) ; but cf. It re Berheimer's Estate, 352 Mo. 91, 176 S.W.2d 15 (1943)
and In re Poe's Estate, 356 Mo. 276, 201 S.W.2d 441 (1948).
Compare Miller v. Hammond, 156 Ohio St. 475, 104 N.E.2d 9 (1952), in which the
Ohio court said: ". ".. In the absence of a testamentary direction to the contrary . . .
all non-testamentary interests will bear . . . the burden of estate taxes attributed to
them." Id. at 493, 104 N.E.2d at 18, with Y.M.C.A. v. Davis, 106 Ohio St. 366, 140 N.E.
114 (1922), aff'd, 264 U.S. 47 (1924). See also McDougall v. Central National Bank of
Cleveland, 157 Ohio St 45, 104 N.E.2d 441 (1952).
Cf. In re Gato's Estate, 276 App. Div. 651, 656, 97 N.Y.S.2d 171, 177 (1st Dep't 1950),
aff'd, 301 N.Y. 653, 93 N.E.2d 924 (1950) ; Mellon Estate, 347 Pa. 520, 536, 32 A.2d 749,
757 (1943) ; Jones Estate, 54 Pa. D. & C. 364, 368 (Orphans Ct. 1945). It would appear
from the dicta in the latter cases that the New York and Pennsylvania courts have, by
virtue of the Del Drago holding, abandoned the common law rule of burden-on-the-residue.
37. N.Y. DECEDENT'S ESTATE LAW § 124. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 63-150 (1947);
CAL. PROD. CODE §§ 970-977 (1944) ; CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 2075-2081 (1949) ; DEL. CODE
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
still others have come to favor equitable apportionment in their first
appellate decisions on the issue. 8 Only a few states have refused to re-
linquish their original position that the residuary legatees must bear the
burden of the tax. 9 Twelve states have not passed upon the question
either by legislative action or by appellate decision, and the law in those
jurisdictions is consequently unsettled."
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2901-2906 (1953) ; FLA. STAT. § 734.041 (1953) ; Me Laws, c. 269 (1945);
MASS. ANN. LAWS, c. 65A, § 5 (1953); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2108 (1943); N.H. Laws,
c. 175 (1943); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ (3A:25-30)-(3A:25-38) (1952); N.D. REV. CODE §
57-3723 (1943) ; TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8350.7-8350.9 (Williams Supp. 1952) ; VA. CODE
§§ (64-150)-(64-155) (1950).
Cf. KAN. GEN. STAT. § 79-1501B (1949) and R.I. Laws, c. 664, § 33 (1939) where
apportionment is allowed only with respect to state additional tax designed to absorb the
80 percent federal credit allowable against the basic federal tax. See ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 113.050 (1953) and TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3683a (1948) for other variations
of apportionment statutes.
Contra: ALA. CODE tit. 51, § 449 (Supp. 1953) and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 291.40 (West
Supp. 1954).
38. Regents of University System of Ga. v. Trust Co. of Ga., 194 Ga. 255, 21 S.E2d
691 (1942) ; Pearcy v. Citizens Bank and Trust Co. of Bloomington, 121 Ind. App. 136,
96 N.E.2d 918 (1951) ; Succession of Ratcliff, 212 La. 563, 33 So.2d 114 (1947) ; In re
Gallagher's Will, 57 N.M. 112, 255 P.2d 317 (1953) ; Industrial Trust Co. v. Budlong,
77 R.I. 428, 76 A.2d 600 (1950) ; Hooker v. Drayton, 69 R.I. 290, 33 A.2d 206 (1943).
39. See Gelin v. Gelin, 229 Minn. 516, 40 N.W.2d 342 (1949); Wanchovia Bank
and Trust Co. v. Green, 236 N.C. 654, 73 S.E.2d 879 (1953) ; Estate of Williamson, 38
Wash.2d 259, 229 P.2d 312 (1951); IN re Uihlein's Will, 264 Wis. 362, 59 N.W.2d 641
(1953). Cf. First National Bank of Chicago v. Hart, 383 Ill. 489, 497, 50 N.E.2d 461,
464 (1943) ; Moorman v. Moorman, 840 Mich. 836, 66 N.W.2d 248 (1954).
40. The twelve states are Arizona, Idaho, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wyoming. For the
sake of a complete picture of treatment given the burden of the tax in all jurisdictions,
correspondence was had with bar association officers, lawyers, law educators, and state
officers in each of the above mentioned states. Replies were received from all but Ari-
zona, and the answers indicated varying degrees of doubt as to the law.
Idaho tends to favor the rule that the residuary legatees must bear the burden of the
tax, in absence of contrary specific testamentary provision. One section of the Idaho
Code provides that in case of intestacy all property, real and personal, without distinction,
is chargeable to the payment of debts (including, of course, taxes). IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 15-1201 (1948). A further section is interpreted to mean that the residuary is to be
resorted to for payment of decedent's debts before property specifically devised or be-
queathed. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 15-1202 (1948).
Liability for the Mississippi death tax attaches to the estate before distribution, and
the executor is given no express right to reimbursement from parties interested in the
taxable estate. Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 9264, 9265, 9283, 9285 (1942). But this procedure
for the state inheritance tax can hardly resolve the question of how the federal estate tax
burden should be treated in Mississippi.
Montana courts are inclined to follow California rulings. Since California has a
specific statute on the question of apportionment, the Montana court can find little
guidance there. The Montana district court, sitting as a probate court, has, however,
approved the practice of placing the burden of the federal estate tax on the residuary
legatees. Lawyers in the state, however, recognize that a residuary legatee might success-
fully raise the question of apportionment on appeal.
Nevada apparently tends to follow the burden-on-the-residue principle; the proposed
basis of the Nevada practice is NEV. Cozup. LAWS § 9882.135 (Supp. 1941). Construing
OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 3 (1951), Oklahoma courts are likely to place the burden of the
NOTES
There is a distinction between statutory and equitable apportionment
which should be noted. The statutes usually extend their operation to the
proration of the federal estate tax among all persons with interests in the
taxable estate.41 The judicial apportionment rule seems to relieve the
residuary legatees from only so much of the full tax burden as is allocable
to non-testamentary or non-probate property, i.e., interests outside the
legal estate.42 The rationale for apportioning the tax only as it applies
to interests outside the legal estate,"3 as recognized by the Indiana court,
federal estate tax on the residuary estate. South Carolina's treatment probably is in
accord with the common law burden-on-the-residue principle. Attorneys in South Dakota
feel the federal estate tax burden would be borne by the residuary like any other claims
against the estate, using S.D. CODE § 56.0402 (1939) as a basis. The Utah State Tax
Commission, nevertheless, recognizes that a cause of action might exist to compel recipi-
ents of a taxed estate to pay their pro-rated portion of the obligation. The Vermont
court might also lean toward pro-rating the burden between special legatees and residuary
legatees.
It has long been conceded by West Virginia practitioners that the federal estate tax
is a debt which must be paid before the residuary estate is distributed to heirs notwith-
standing the absence of either Supreme Court of Appeals decision or statute on the specific
point. At the 1953 session of the West Virginia legislature, a bill was introduced which,
if enacted, would have provided for proration of the federal estate tax; it was not acted
upon, however. It is anticipated that a similar bill will be introduced at the 1955 session
of the legislature.
The Attorney General's Office of Wyoming did not care to speculate what position
the courts of that state would be likely to take on the problem.
41. The New York statute, the prototype of similar statutes in other jurisdictions,
provides briefly that in the absence of testamentary direction to the contrary, where an
executor has paid or may be required to pay estate taxes, the burden of the taxes shall be
prorated among the distributees of property required to be included for tax purposes in
the estate of the decedent. Where property does not come into possession of the executor,
the statute makes it the executor's duty to recover from whosoever is in possession the
proportionate amount of the tax. See Polisher, Estate Tax Apportionment, 84 TRUSTS
AND ESTATES 99 (1947) ; N.Y. DECEDENT'S ESTATE LAW § 124.
Connecticut has by recent amendment provided, however, that if the probate judge
finds that federal and state taxes have been borne by a party or parties in interest in a
manner satisfactory to them or to their legal representative, no proration shall be made
unless specifically requested by a party in interest. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 938c (Supp.
1953).
42. In Ohio, judicial apportionment is the recognized rule. See Miller v. Ham-
mond, 156 Ohio St. 475, 104 N.E.2d 9 (1952) and McDougall v. Central Nat'l Bank of
Cleveland, 157 Ohio St. 45, 104 N.E.2d 441 (1952). But apportionment between specific
and residuary legatees has been refused. In re Cole's Estate, 111 N.E.2d 35 (Ohio Prob.
Ct. 1952). . The actual effect of this is to limit apportionment to non-testamentary and
non-probate property.
In New Mexico, there is an implication that probate property is not apportionable.
Cf. In re Gallagher's Will, 57 N.M. 112, 130, 255 P.2d 317, 328-329 (1953). In this case,
the executor did obtain reimbursement, however, from a joint tenant.
The Rhode Island court limits the executor's right to reimbursement to distributees
who are not a part of the "true estate." Industrial Trust Co. v. Budlong, 77 R.I. 428, 437,
76 A.2d 600, 604-605 (1950) ; cf. Hooker v. Drayton, 69 R.I. 290, 33 A.2d 206 (1943).
43. "[T]he legal estate . . .means only the personal property owned by an intestate
decedent at the time of his death, except where it is necessary to use all, or a portion, of
the real property he owned to pay debts." Pearcy v. Citizens Bank and Trust Co. of
Bloomington, 121 Ind. App. 136, 157, 96 N.E. 2d 918, 923 (1951). In this case, the only
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
is to avoid the apparent anomaly of allowing the executor to use the assets
of the legal estate to enhance property which he does not administer.4
New Jersey courts had applied for a period a peculiar variation of
the burden-on-the-residue rule, which, in cases where a will was involved,
seemed comparable to judicial apportionment.4 5 The state's courts con-
strued the testator's express direction to pay the estate tax on some items
out of the residue to raise the implication that the tax on other items was
not intended to be paid out of the residue but charged to the property
with respect to which it was levied.4"
To state flatly that the apportionment of the federal estate tax by
either state judicial or legislative action or by a strained construction of
a will, is superior to the Hamlin doctrine of burden on the residue would
be an oversimplification. Arguments may be advanced to support both
views and should be considered.
In refusing to compel proration, the courts have taken a number of
positions. Some have held that the federal statute controls, and that, as
the statute makes the tax payable by the executor prior to distribution of
the estate, the logical implication is that the tax is an administrative ex-
pense to be borne entirely by the residuary. The holding in the Del
Drago case, however, appears to have refuted this interpretation.48 An-
other theory is that the decedent, being charged with knowledge of the
law and of his power to direct apportionment must be presumed by his
silence to have intended none. In other words, he expects the specific
legatees to enjoy the full benefits bestowed upon them and the residuary
Indiana reported decision on the question of apportionment, reimbursement was enforced
against the widow who was a joint tenant of decedent as well as a life insurance
beneficiary.
44. Ibid. Cf. Hampton's Administrators v. Hampton, 188 Ky. 199, 221 S.W. 496
(1920); Martin v. Martin's Administrators, 283 Ky. 513, 142 S.W.2d 164 (1940);
Trimble v. Hatcher's Executor, 295 Ky. 178, 173 S.W.2d 985 (1943), cert. denied sub non.
Trimble v. Justice, 321 U.S. 747 (1944).
45. Where a will was not involved, New Jersey would have been classified as a non-
apportionment state. See Brauburger v. Riley, 7 N.J. Super. 576, 72 A.2d 363 (Ch. 1950)
where beneficiaries of an inter vivos trust, made in contemplation of death, were not
obligated to reimburse the executor. New Jersey now has a statute providing for appor-
tionment. N.J. REv. STAT. § 3A: 25-30 (Supp. 1953).
46. Vondunuhl v. Montclair Trust Co., 14 N.J. Super. 300, 81 A.2d 822 (Ch. 1951);
Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Suydam, 125 N.J. Eq. 458, 6 A.2d 392 (Ch. 1939) ; Gaede v.
Carroll, 114 N.J. Eq. 524, 169 At. 172 (Ct. Err. & App. 1933).
47. Plunkett v. Old Colony Trust Co., 233 Mass. 471, 124 N.E. 265 (1919).
48. See discussion of effect of Del Drago decision on pp. 223-224 supra. But see
Isaacson, Executor v. Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 325 Mass. 469, 91 N.E.2d 334
(1950) where the Massachusetts court decided against apportionment. It is to be noted
that all the cases cited by the court were decided before receiving, in the Del Drago deci-
sion, the benefit of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal statute. These
cases placed great emphasis on the interpretation of Congressional intent as precluding
apportionment. See a good discussion of the Isaacson holding in 30 B.U.L. Rev. 449
(1950).
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legatee to get what is left for distribution."9 But even accepting the fact
that the testator wanted the residuary legatee to bear the burden of the
tax, it should not be presumed that he contemplated the harsh results that
often take place."0  Some courts see the very character of an estate tax as
militating against apportionment. 1 This rationale appears equally un-
sound since the tax is not simply levied on the "true estate" but includes
non-probate or non-testamentary interests as well.52 Another approach
is to find in the explicit provision for apportionment with respect to in-
surance proceeds and recipients of property under a power of appoint-
ment a clear indication that no other exceptions were intended by Con-
gress.5" Again, in view of the Del Drago decision, this rule of construc-
tion would appear not to preclude the states from acting. Finally, courts
express the view that the question of apportionment is one to be deter-
mined by the legislature. 4 There is nothing in the estate tax law, how-
ever, to prevent the state courts, in the exercise of their jurisdiction over
the administration and settlement of estates, from applying equitable
rules through which apportionment may be accomplished.55
The courts permitting apportionment might justify their stand on
the basis of a number of related legal theories all of which are based on an
assumption that there has been an unjust receipt of property by those
49. Cf. Amoskeag Trust Co. v. Trustees of Dartmouth College, 89 N.H. 471, 474,
200 Atl. 786, 788 (1938).
50. For example, why should it be presumed that the testator intended that his
widow to whom the residue is willed should bear the tax burden and thereby allow more
distant relatives to go tax-free? Cf. Ely's Estate, 28 Pa. D. & C. 663, 672 (Orphans Ct.
1936).
"The great complaint against the estate tax has been that this burden falls upon
the residuary legatees, who are, under most wills, the widow, children, or nearer or
more dependent relatives. Cases have arisen where the residue has been greatly depleted
by the imposition of the Federal Estate tax." N.Y. LEGIS. Doc. No. 69 at p. 197 (1930).
51. Matter of Hamlin, 226 N.Y. 407, 124 N.E. 4 (1919).
In the language of another court, "[It would be anomalous to impose upon a bene-
ficiary the burden of a tax which is graduated solely by the capacity to pay of the donor;
while the imposition of the burden of a tax, measured solely by the size of a donor's
estate, upon the donor or his general estate is dictated by factors which may at least
be regarded as relevant even though there may be difference of opinion as to the justice
of such a tax in all cases." Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. Winthrop, 238 N.Y. 488,
496-497, 144 N.E. 769, 777-778 (1924), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 633 (1925).
52. See discussion of rationale of judicial apportionment on pp. 225-226 supra.
53. Cf. Bemis v. Converse, 246 Mass. 131, 134, 140 N.E. 686, 687 (1923). But see
discussion of this point in note 5 supra.
54. "We deem that it would be unwarranted judicial legislation for this court to
attempt to apportion the impact of the federal estate tax as did the Kentucky and Ohio
Courts." In re Uihlein's Will, 264 Wis. 362, 376, 59 N.W.2d 641, 648 (1953).
55. Cf. Pearcy v. Citizens Bank and Trust Co. of Bloomington, 121 Ind. App. 136,
147, 96 N.E.2d 918, 923 (1951).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
who do not pay their share of the tax."6 That assumption begs one of the
vital questions: What was the testator's intention? The courts which
have allowed apportionment have done so on the premise that the pre-
sumption of the testator's intention is a mere fiction in most cases, not of
itself precluding apportionment, and that the Code requirement that the
executor pay the taxes is simply procedural." The case for apportion-
ment has been strengthened greatly by the Del Drago ruling to the effect
that in the absence of contrary direction in the will, the states should
determine the incidence of the tax. But, obviously, there is little merit in
the adherence to either the burden-on-the-residue or the equitable appor-
tionment principle through the employment of legal fictions. The case
for or against apportioning the burden of the estate tax must stand or fall
on broader policy grounds.
Proponents of apportionment complain of the inequity of burdening
the residuary legatees, who are likely to be the widow, children, or depend-
ent relatives of the decedent, with the entire tax."8  Opponents of pro-
ration see a greater unfairness in the imposition of a tax which is gradu-
ated solely by the size of the donor's estate rather than the amount actually
received by the heir, legatee, or others. 9 To be sure, hardships can result
in either case, but apportionment seems to reach a more just solution."°
The desirable features of apportionment, however, may be negated, accord-
ing to one writer, by resulting disadvantages of complex estate accounting,
of multitudinous will construction suits, administrative expenses, and de-
lays in distribution. 1 Difficulty in integrating the federal act with ex-
isting state law has indeed fostered more litigation in connection with
the federal estate tax than with any other excise.62 A survey of some of
56. (1) unjust enrichment; (2) equality of burden is equity; (3) indemnity for
discharging a duty of another; (4) action for money paid to another's use. See Fleming,
Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes, 43 ILL. L. Rav. 153, 156 (1948).
57. See Hampton's Administrators v. Hampton, 188 Ky. 199, 202, 221 S.W. 496,
497 (1920).
58. Ely's Estate, 28 Pa. D. & C. 663, 672 (Orphans Ct. 1936,) ; N.Y. LEGIS. Doc. No.
69 at p. 266; cf. 85 U. OF PA. L. REV. 328, 329 (1937).
59. See Note, 40 COL. L. Rav. 690, 699 (1940).
60. 1 PAUL, op. cit. supra note 1, § 13.54. But cf. Uber's Estate, 29 Pa. D. & C. 341,
346 (Orphans Ct. 1937) where the court favored the burden on the residue and said:
"[A] legacy of $1,000 from a large estate will, if there is an apportionment, pay more
tax than a legacy of the same amount from a small estate."
61. See Sheffield, Notes on Equitable Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes-A
Consideration of the New York Statute, 19 CONN. B.J. 6, 16-17 (1945).
62. Osgood, supra note 20, at 252.
Indeed, the apportionment act of Maine was said to have created more difficulties
than it solved and to have opened the road to hardship in many cases. Some objections
to the Maine statute were: confusion, expensive litigation, and prolongation of the
administration of estates. Lawyers objected to the fact that the executor was forced to
become a litigant to collect the share of taxes due from those who received benefits
which did not pass through the executor's hands. There was also a lack of clarity as to
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the problems accompanying apportionment by the states may afford some
insight as to its efficacy."5
Both federal and state acts reserve a right in the testator to place the
burden of estate tax where he sees fit. Where the direction in the will is
clear there is little difficulty;4 but because of the complexity of the law
regarding the death tax, the great mass of litigation in the field of estate
tax apportionment has arisen over the nature and sufficiency of the
testator's expressed intent.6 5 Many cases seem to ignore the testator's
desires and hold that apportionment should apply, in spite of seeming con-
trary direction, on the grounds of public policy, legislative intention,
equity, and the strong presumption that the testator intended apportion-
ment except to the extent that it is expressly negated." From the bulk of
cases on the subject of contrary direction to apportionment, the following
generalizations can be formulated: (1) unless the will directs "with
certainty of expression" against apportionment, the statute applies ;'
(2) the burden of proof is on those contending against apportionment ;"8
(3) only unlimited directions to pay "all" taxes from the residuary
estate will include taxes on property not passing under the will;"9
(4) where contrary directions are limited to property and devises passing
under the will, all other property in the taxable estate will have to bear a
proportionate share of taxes."0 While the rules of contrary direction may
not always be consistent with the testator's true intention, they certainly
are more desirable from the standpoint of obtaining the testator's intent
than the situation that exists in states where there are no apportionment
the method of computing the tax. See Mitnick, State Legislative Apportionment of the
Federal Estate Tax, 10 MD. L. REv. 289, 328 (1949). The Maine statute has been re-
pealed. Me. Laws, c. 220 (1947).
63. It may be noted that the various objections to the constitutionality of the ap-
portionment statutes on such grounds as deprivation of due process, impairment of con-
tractual rights of beneficiaries, and retrospective operation have been uniformly re-
jected. See generally Note, 26 A.L.R.2d 925-935 (1952). A discussion of the retro-
spective operation of the estate tax is to be found in Note, 26 A.L.R. 1461 (1923), sup-
plemented in Notes, 66 A.L.R. 404 (1930), 109 A.L.R. 858 (1937), and 114 A.L.R. 518
(1938).
64. Note, 15 A.L.R.2d 1216 (1951).
65. Mitnick, supra note 62, at 310.
66. Wright, The Nebraska Apportionment Act, 32 NEB. L. REv. 517, 533 (1953).
67. In re Mills Estate, 189 Misc. 136, 64 N.Y.S.2d 105 (Surr. Ct. 1946), aff'd, 297
N.Y. 1012, 80 N.E. 535 (1948); In re Dellmar's Will, 179 Misc. 844, 40 N.Y.S.2d 99
(Surr. Ct. 1943).
In California, however, the direction need not be in so many words, but might be
gathered from an interpretation of testator's words in the light of the law existing at
the time of execution of the will. See, e.g., Estate of Hotaling, 74 Cal. App.2d 898, 170
P.2d 111 (1946).
68. In re Blumenthal's Will, 180 Misc. 895, 42 N.Y.S.2d 898 (Surr. Ct. 1943), aff'd,
293 N.Y. 707, 56 N.E.2d 588 (1944).
69. In re Halle's Will, 270 App. Div. 619, 61 N.Y.S.2d 694 (1st Dep't 1946).
70. In re Ryan's Estate, 178 Misc. 1007, 36 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (Surr. Ct. 1942).
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statutes and no judicial decisions protecting the residuary estate from
dilution through federal estate tax payment.7 '
Most writers reason that excessive litigation over contrary direction
is due to improper drafting of wills and trust instruments. 2 While,
generally, decedents whose property becomes subject to the estate tax
have had adequate time to plan their estate distributions73 and hence to
designate the persons who will be ultimately responsible for the tax, the
efficacy of apportionment statutes depends too much upon the care with
which wills and trusts are drawn."4 The fact that an experienced attorney
drew up a will with insufficient directions to vary the statutory scheme
should not be grounds for indicating a lack of intent on the part of the
testator.7" What would seem more desirable than giving the decedent
freedom to provide either for or against apportionment of the tax is a
greater degree of certainty in the law.
Another problem implicit in apportionment arises as a result of cer-
tain types of insurance contracts. In spite of the Code provisions for
apportionment among insurance beneficiaries, the proration of the tax
allocable to insurance has been dilatory even in those states which have
apportionment statutes. The reason for this is that, frequently, the
beneficiaries' primary means of paying such a tax would be the proceeds
held by the insurance company, perhaps to be paid out slowly over a period
of years. As a result some attempt has been made to reach the insurance
fund prior to the time it is paid to the beneficiaries. Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Florida, and New Jersey apportionment acts specify that the
tax which would be apportioned to the beneficiary cannot be recovered
71. In those states in which the burden-on-the-residue principle is still followed,
even if the testator provides, for apportionment in his will, a question arises as to whether
such a provision can saddle prior transferees or inter-vivos trusts with the tax. Fleming,
supra note 56, at 168. There is much persuasion in the argument, however, that if the
interest of the decedent in the property is sufficient for tax purposes, it is sufficient to
enable him to shift the tax burden. Ibid. But requiring the testator to provide for ap-
portionment places him in a dilemma, since by so doing, he reveals a belief that the
transaction involved will be subject to the estate tax. See generally on this problem
Karch, The Apportionment of Death Taxes, 54 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1940) ; Note, 62 HARV.
L. REV. 1022 (1949).
72. See e.g., Fleming, supra note 56, at 164-165 (1948) ; Reidy, Problems of Ap-
portionnient of Estate Taxes Under State Statutes, A.B.A. PROC., SEC. REAL PROP. PRO-
BATE AND TRUST LAW 23, 35 (1949).
73. From a study of estate tax statistics it was discovered that of the decedents
whose property was subject to the estate tax, 81 percent were over 60 years of age and
58 percent were over 70 years old when they died. Hearings, supra note 20, at 82.
74. "There is something wrong with laws that place such a high premium on the
possession of technical knowledge; that penalize the innocent or ill advised." BOWE, TAX
PLANNING FOR ESTATES 86 (1949 ed. Vanderbilt U. Press).
75. That fact was taken into consideration as a reason for denying a variance from
the statutory scheme in the case of In re Dennis Estate, 184 Misc. 178, 53 N.Y.S.2d 797
(Surr. Ct. 1945).
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from the insurer.7" The same result has been reached, without statutory
provision, in the federal courts and in the courts of Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, and Kentucky." New York takes a more elastic view in holding
that the executor can collect from the insurer to the extent of proceeds in
the insurer's hands immediately payable at the time of apportionment."
A vain attempt to reach the funds in the hands of the insurer has
been made under the "toll theory". This is the theory that insurance
contracts are deemed implicitly to include a clause to the effect that the
amount of tax levied against the fund is immediately payable from the
proceeds and that the beneficiary succeeds only to the amount in excess
of the government's toll."' The theory was rejected by the New York
Court of Appeals in Matter of Zahn.s" The outgrowth of the Zahn deci-
sion was the introduction of a bill in the New York legislature which
would have allowed all persons who held property which was included in
gross taxable estates and which was required to contribute to the blrden
of the estate taxes to withhold payment to beneficiaries of the property
until the tax burden on it was determined or provision made for payment
of the tax apportioned to the property.8' The bill did not become law.82
76. MASS. ANN. LAWS c. 65A, § 5A (Supp. 1953) ; N.H. Laws, c. 175 (1943) ; FLA.
STAT. § 734.041(5) (1953) ; N.J. REV. STAT. § 3A: 25-36 (Supp. 1953).
77. See Hughes v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 159 F.2d 110 (7th Cir. 1946) ; Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Helvering, 128 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1942); In re Moreland's
Estate, 351 Pa. 623, 42 A.2d 63 (1945) ; Commercial Trust Co. v. Thurber, 136 N.J. Eq.
471, 42 A.2d 571 (Ch. 1945) ; Marks v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of U.S., 135
N.J. Eq. 339, 38 A.2d 833 (Ch. 1944). See also the discussion in Wentling, Insurance
Proceeds and Estate Tax Proration, 9 U. OF PiTT. L. REV. 157, 160 (1948).
78. In other words, a debtor-creditor relationship must exist between the insurance
company and beneficiaries before the executor can recover from the company. Other-
wise, the insurance company cannot be classified as either "a person interested in the
estate" or "in possession of any fund." See Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Dimond,
283 App. Div. 624, 130 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1st Dep't 1954). But see Matter of Wexler, CCH
INH. EST. & GiFt TAx REP. 1 17,336 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1951) where insurance carriers
were directed by the surrogate's court to pay to the executor of the Wexler estate the
pro-rata share of federal and New York estate taxes allocated to life insurance proceeds
not immediately payable to the beneficiaries.
It is probable that Nebraska will follow the New York rule as exemplified by Mutual
Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Dimond, supra. See Wright, supra note 66, at 531.
79. Under this theory the insurer becomes, in effect, a withholding agent with two
funds: one for the beneficiary and one for the taxing authorities. See In re Scott's
Estate, 158 Misc. 481, 286 N.Y. Supp. 138 (Surr. Ct. 1936), affd, 274 N.Y. 538, 10 N.E.2d
538 (1937), cert. denied sub. nora. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Central Hanover
Bank and Trust Co., 302 U.S. 721 (1937).
80. 188 Misc. 856, 69 N.Y.S.2d 829 (Surr. Ct. 1947), rev'd, 273 App. Div. 476, 77
N.Y.S.2d 904 (1st Dep't 1948), aff'd, 300 N.Y. 1, 87 N.E.2d 558 (1949). This was a
particularly hard case as the beneficiaries had squandered the funds before the executor
could obtain reimbursement.
81. N.Y. S. 2030, Feb. 18, 1948.
82. It was feared that such an amendment would have delayed payment of insurance
proceeds until it could be determined first, whether any federal or state taxes were
payable, and secondly, if so, how much was due and what portion was chargeable to such
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The courts have also refused to retain insurance proceeds until determina-
tion of the correct allocation of taxes against the fund.83
It would seem that reimbursement of the executor would be more
expeditious, and the possibility that the proceeds would be exhausted
prior to proration would be obviated if the taxable insurance fund could
somehow be reached before it became payable to the beneficiary.
The marital deduction provision introduced by the Revenue Act of
1948 has proved to be rife with technicalities and has caused additional
problems in state attempts to apportion the tax. 4 Since the estate receives
a tax deduction for all property passing to the surviving spouse up to fifty
percent of the total estate, it is only natural for the claim to be made that
since the property generates the tax deduction, it should pass to the widow,
whether under a will or by statute, free of any tax burden.85  Most state
apportionment statutes are made inapplicable to exemptions and deduc-
tions granted by the federal act.86 Such a statutory direction has been
insurance. This, it was claimed, would be an unnecessary delay particularly in view of
the fact that less than one in one hundred policy proceeds are subject to any federal
estate taxes. See Reidy, supra note 72, at 31-32.
Yet the proration of estate taxes against insurance proceeds presents a problem which
"arises frequently enough to encourage a final solution which will permit the rapid
settling of decedent's estates and the prompt payment of insurance proceeds." Wentling,
supra note 77, at 170.
83. See Westcoast Life Insurance Co. v. Twogood, 83 F.Supp. 710 (S.D. Cal. 1949)
where the court held that the liability of life insurance beneficiaries for an estate tax
does not exist, and cannot exist, until a tax has been paid.
84. See Fleming, Five Years' Experience with the Marital Deduction, 34 CHI. B.A.
REC. 247 (1953).
Many complicated computations are involved in the marital deduction provision. If
an apportionment statute is operative and the surviving spouse is given an amount equal
to the maximum marital deduction, such share must be diminished by the state tax at-
tributable thereto. The state statutes usually provide that allowance be made for any
exemptions or deductions granted by the act imposing the tax. Seemingly, the surviving
spouse's share of the federal estate tax would be freed, but since the share has been
diminished by the state tax, the full undiminished share does not pass to the spouse, and
the federal estate tax in respect of the state tax on the spouse's share has to be taken
into account. That requires a further reduction to compute the federal estate tax on the
amount by which the spouse's share is reduced by the estate tax. If a will directs pay-
ment of all taxes out of the residuary estate, and a surviving spouse has a share in the
residuary estate, then, even in those states having appdrtionment statutes, the total federal
and state death taxes will have to be paid out of the residuary estate, and again the
computation of mutually dependent sums has to be made. These difficulties do not arise
if the amount which passes to the surviving spouse is greatly in excess of one-half the
adjusted gross estate. See TRACHTAIAN, supra note 18, at 52-56. See also Estate Tax
Form 706, May 1949 (editorial insert) in 3 P-H 1950 FED. TAX SERv. ff 24,873 (1950).
85. See Fleming, supra note 84, at 248.
86. See e.g., N.Y. DECEDENT'S ESTATE LAW § 124: "[I]n making . . . proration
allowances shall be made for any exemptions granted by the act imposing the tax and
for any deductions allowed by such act for the purpose of arriving at the value of the
net estate. .... "
The recently revised Pennsylvania law is more explicit on this matter. See PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 20, § 844(b) (Supp. 1953) : "Any interest for which deduction is allowable
under Federal revenue laws . . . such as property passing to or in trust for a surviving
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interpreted consistently to exclude grants to charities from the tax.s
There seems no valid reason why the same benefits should not accrue to
the surviving spouse through the marital deduction provision.
This reasoning is not accepted by all the state courts, and whether or
not a state will allow the full marital deductible share to be received tax-
free cannot be predicted on the basis of that state's general disposition
toward apportionment. While most jurisdictions having apportionment
statutes have followed In re Peters" in allowing the surviving spouse the
full benefit of the deduction, Maryland and Virginia, both having appor-
tionment statutes, do not, and are thereby in accord with the burden-on-
the-residue states on this point." This seems particularly unusual when
it is observed that in Ohio and Kentucky, where apportionment is only
judicially sanctioned, the Peters rule is followed, and the widow may
receive her deductible share tax-free." But since the judicial method of
apportionment extends only to non-testamentary or non-probate property,
it is doubtful that the widow taking under a will could receive the benefit
of this rule. As a result, she may be wise in some cases to waive the will
and take her statutory share or dower interest." The fact that judicial
spouse and charitable, public or similar gifts or bequests to the extent of the allowed
deduction . . . to that extent no apportionment shall be made against such interest ... "
87. Generally, charitable institutions do not have to bear their share of the tax. See
Wilkinson's Estate, 37 Pa. D. & C. 243 (Orphans Ct. 1940) ; In re Starr's Estate, 157
Misc. 103, 282 N.Y. Supp. 957 (1935). But if there is an effective direction in the will,
the charity may have to bear its share. Cf. North's Estate, 50 Pa. D. & C. 703 (Orphans
Ct. 1944).
A charitable remainder will suffer, however, when the will is silent because the
corpus of a temporary interest, even though the remainder is to charity, must bear its
share of the tax. In re Blumenthal's Estate, 182 Misc. 137, 46 N.Y.S.2d 688 (Surr. Ct.
1943), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 707, 56 N.E. 588 (1944).
88. 204 Misc. 333, 88 N.Y.S.2d 142 (Surr. Ct. 1949), aff'd, 275 App. Div. 950, 89
N.Y.S.2d 651 (2d Dept. 1949). Accord: In re Cushing's Estate, 113 Cal. App. 2d 319,
248 P.2d 482 (1952) ; Estate of Jerome, 139 Conn. 285, 93 A.2d 139 (1950) ; I re Fuch's
Estate, 1 Fla. Supp. 28, 60 So.2d 536 (Cir. Ct. App. 1952).
89. Compare Weinberg v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 198 Md. 539, 85 A.2d 50
(1951) and Baylor v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce of Norfolk, 194 Va. 1, 72 S.E.2d 282
(1952) with Northern Trust Co. v. Wilson, 344 Ill. App. 508, 101 N.E.2d 604 (1951) ;
Moorman v. Moorman, 340 Mich. 636, 66 N.W.2d 248 (1954) ; In re Uihlein's Will, 264
Wis. 362, 59 N.W.2d 641 (1953). See also Wright, supra note 66, at 531 on the likely
treatment in Nebraska. It appeared that Nebraska had tended to follow the Maryland
and Virginia rule in taxing the widow's deductible share. This seems to have been
changed by amendment. Neb. Laws 1953, c. 95, § 3.
90. Lincoln Bank and Trust Co. v. Huber, 240 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951);
Campbell v. Lloyd, 117 N.E.2d 45 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954).
91. See note 90 supra. Cf. Miller v. Hammond, 156 Ohio St. 476, 104 N.E.2d 9
(1952). This was a reversal of the decision in In re Miller's Estate, 42 Ohio Opin. 325,
94 N.E.2d 67 (Prob. Ct. 1950) where the probate court seems to reject the judicial ap-
portionment rule and refuses to allow the widow to receive her allowed share tax-free.
"Nowhere . . .will be found any indication at all that Congress intended, in pro-
viding for the marital deduction, to exempt the surviving spouse up to the amount of the
marital deduction, from sharing in the burden of the estate tax ... " Id. at 326, 94
N.E.2d at 69.
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apportionment is limited as it is, coupled with the Peters method of treat-
ing the marital deduction, could lead to results wholly inconsistent with
the purposes of Congress as well as the intentions of the decedent."
In denying the widow an opportunity to get her share of the estate,
up to the allowed marital deduction, tax-free, the courts resort to argu-
ments similar to those advanced for denying apportionment.93 It must
be noted again that the courts are thus utilizing fictions and specious
rationale to deny the full effect of an equitable feature of the federal
estate tax law.
Where a decedent leaves property located or administered in a state
other than the place of his domicile at the time of his death, a conflict of
laws may arise as to the proper allocation of the tax burden. The courts
are not in agreement that the law of decedent's domicile should control the
question.9" Since the power of the state to impose its own estate tax does
92. Suppose, for example, decedent's taxable estate includes an inter-vivos trust of
which X is a beneficiary, a specific bequest to Y, with the residue of the estate to Z, the
surviving spouse. If nothing is said in the will as to how the tax burden is to be borne,
the entire estate would benefit by the marital deduction provision. Because his interest
is non-testamentary or non-probate, X would be required to bear his pro-rata share of the
tax. Y, whose interest is testamentary, would be entitled to his entire bequest, un-
diminished by the federal estate tax unless the funds held by X and Z were insufficient
to meet the levy. Z would, as residuary legatee, bear the large share of the tax.
But should Z find it advantageous to waive the will and accept her statutory share
of the estate or her dower interest, what would be the result? (For purposes of sim-
plicity, it will be assumed that the residuary had consisted solely of real estate and that
what Z would receive would be equal to or less than the allowed marital deduction.)
Then the estate would again get the benefit of the marital deduction provision, and X
would still be liable for his pro-rata share of the tax. But Z would now get the full
benefit of the marital deduction provision since the interest she received was not part of
the "true estate" and therefore was subject to the judicial apportionment rule which,
when combined with the Peters decision, insulates the surviving spouse from the burden
of the tax. Y, however, not only may have his bequest diminished by the surviving
spouse's election to take her statutory or dower share, but also will be forced into a posi-
tion of having to bear the remaining tax burden. This anomalous situation would not
occur in a state having statutory apportionment. The surviving spouse would get her
deductible share tax-free whether she took under the will or dower, and the specific
legatee would have to reimburse the executor notwithstanding the spouse's choice.
93. Some courts state that Congress did not intend the widow's share entirely to
escape the impact of the estate tax. See In re Uihlein's Will, 264 Wis. 362, 59 N.W.2d
641 (1953). Others point out that in the absence of an apportionment statute, the courts
must adhere to the burden-on-the-residue rule. Northern Trust Co. v. Wilson, 344 Ill.
App. 508, 101 N.E.2d 604 (1951). Again they liken the estate tax to any other adminis-
tration expense, which must be paid prior to distribution. Ibid.
94. One view is that the law of the forum is controlling where the decedent at his
death was domiciled in the territory of the forum, even though part of the taxed estate
is located or administered outside of his territory. This view is followed in New York
and Florida. See Note, 16 A.L.R.2d 1282-1286 (1951). But in Massachusetts it has been
held that the law of decedent's domicile is not controlling and can be given no extra-
territorial effect. Isaacson v. Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Co., 325 Mass. 469, 91
N.E.2d 334 (1950). Accord: First National Bank of Miami v. First Trust Co. of St.
Paul, 64 N.W.2d 524 (Minn. 1954) where federal estate taxes attributable to a Florida
NOTES
extend to the personal property outside the state of one domiciled in the
state, it is arguable that the power to apportion the federal estate tax
should be as broad, and that, hence, the tax apportionment power of the
domicile ought to extend to transfers of personalty situated in foreign
states. " A different problem arises in regard to land since the state has
no authority to tax realty outside of its jurisdiction." Additional factors
are that the domicile of a decedent is not always certain,9" and the state in
which the property is located may be concerned with it for purposes of
taxing the succession or protecting creditors from dilution of their
security.' s
A problem also arises as to the fact that, in the absence of statute, an
executor has no authority to maintain an action on a claim of a deceased
in a state other than that of his appointment.9 A second state might
refuse to grant letters of ancillary administration if the only ground for
appointment is the tax claim."' 0 At any rate, the executor's meeting of
the prerequisites of jurisdiction has at times jarred the orderly process
of settling the problem of what state law shall apply when prorating the
decedent's estate included intangible personalty subject to a Minnesota trust created by
decedent while a resident there was not apportionable or payable out of trust assets.
95. See Schiaroli, Apportionment of Federal and State Estate Taxes in Connecticut,
24 TAXES 1086, 1092 (1946).
96. Ibid.
97. For an excellent account of the uncertainty in determining domicile, see Tweed
and Sargent, Death and Taxes Are Certain-But What of Domicile, 53 HARV. L. REv.
68 (1939).
In at least one instance, the collection of death taxes by two states has been upheld.
See Dorrance v. Pennsylvania, 309 Pa. 151, 163 Atl. 303 (1932), cert. denied, 287 U.S.
660 (1932) and Dorrance v. Martin, 116 N.J.L. 362, 184 At. 743 (1936), cert. denied,
298 U.S. 678 (1936), rehearing denied, 298 U.S. 692 (1936). In one case each of four
states tried to collect death taxes on the theory that decedent was domiciled in that state.
See Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
98. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 553-554 (3d ed. 1949).
99. Ibid. The fiduciary of an estate or the over-taxed beneficiary should not be
allowed to achieve what the state itself cannot do, and as a general rule, courts of one
state will not enforce the tax laws of another. Schiaroli, supra note 95, at 1093.
Query: how can a tax be apportioned against out-of-state trust property and foreign
beneficiaries when no jurisdiction over the property or parties can be secured by a pro-
ration state to compel payment? The action would have to be brought in a foreign state
by either an ancillary administrator appointed there or by a beneficiary who has borne
his share. Jurisdiction would be based on the following grounds: (1) The power to
levy a state estate tax and to apportion the federal estate tax are co-extensive, and in
both cases the state jurisdiction is in aid of its power to protect itself against the avoid-
ance of its tax laws through inter-vivos transfers of a testamentary character. (2) A
decree of the probate court is supposed to be given full faith and credit in all states. Ibid.
100. Id. at 1094. For cases where death tax laws of one state have not been enforced
in others, see First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1932) ; Baldwin v.
Missouri, 281 U.S. 586 (1930). But apparent in Okla. Tax Commission v. Rodgers, 238
Mo. App. 1115, 193 S.W.2d 919 (1946), is the fact that the traditional hostility toward
out-of-state tax claims is breaking down.
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burden of the federal estate tax according to the domicile-at-death test.''
One commentator points out, however, that there exists no rule of
policy in any state that the tax burden be borne by the residuary estate. It
is merely a rule of construction which designates the funds for paying an
unavoidable charge. Therefore, he concludes, non-apportionment states
in which is situated the res of a testator dying in an apportionment state
should be willing to accept the proration statute of the latter." 2 But in
view of the different treatment afforded the estate tax burden by states,
a way must be found to overcome the problem of jurisdictional conflict
to assure certainty. The present status of the law is an invitation to
litigation.'
It is generally true that state methods of apportionment have gone
far toward reaching an equitable treatment of the federal estate tax
burden inadequately suggested by the Congressional provisions."4 Ap-
portionment is to be preferred over an inheritance tax as it meets the
particular objection of inequitable burden on the residue and reduces the
estate tax to the level of an inheritance tax,0 5 except that in the collection
of the tax the compilation is simplified, and the heirs, rather than the
taxing officials, are concerned with apportionment. Nevertheless, the
piecemeal control over the estate tax has brought serious problems in the
interpretation of the provisions entitling the executor to reimbursement,
in the treatment of the marital deduction provision, and in regard to
jurisdictional questions, which have resulted in a general lack of uni-
101. For cases and discussion, see, Mitnick, supra note 62, at 307-310.
102. Reidy, supra note 72, at 28.
103. Jurisdictional conflict is not the last of the problems arising from the states'
attempts to allocate the burden of the federal estate tax. Other problems likely to arise
under apportionment statutes involve the treatment of penalty and interest on delinquent
payment and temporary interests. At least one case held that the interest on the federal
estate tax should be apportioned in the same ratio as the tax is apportioned. See In re
Clark's Estate, 169 Misc. 202, 7 N.Y.S.2d 176 (Surr. Ct. 1938). The weight of authority
now applies the income, to the extent that income was actually earned on taxes due, to the
payment of the tax interest. The rationale behind this is that the sovereign's toll attaches
on the principal of the estate at the instant of one's death. No one can share the income
until the tax and interest have satisfied the toll. In re Harjes' Estate, 170 Misc. 431, 10
N.Y.S.2d 627 (Surr. Ct. 1939). See Reidy, supra note 72, at 33 for a summary of the
rules evolving from litigation on this matter.
One administrative difficulty has been obviated in most state statutes which provide
that the share of the tax prorated to temporary interests shall be payable out of the
principal or corpus, not out of the income. See Mitnick, supra note 62, at 317.
104. As one writer puts it: "While a will is the cornucopia from which flows the
fruits amassed by the decedent, the apportionment statutes are the balances that auto-
matically come into play, when the will is silent, and provide for a fair, impartial distri-
bution of the . . . fruits." Reidy, supra note 72, at 36.
105. For another proposed cure of present estate tax difficulties, see Vickrey, An
Integrated Successions Tax, 22 TAXES 368 (1944). Mr. Vickrey proposes a tax struc-
ture which would make the burden of the tax dependent not only upon the size of the
transfer but also upon the difference in ages between decedent and legatee.
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formity throughout the states.
Since no serious constitutional attack has been made upon the present
federal act because of its incidence provisions,' it would seem that the
door is open for Congressional enactment making it the executor's duty
to obtain reimbursement from all persons interested in the taxable estate.
In view of the problems growing out of the state methods of handling
apportionment, specific recommendations under such a proposed federal
apportionment act are in order. First, it is submitted that if testators
are denied the privilege of giving directions contrary to the proration of
the tax, and apportionment is made mandatory in all cases, the Act's
purpose of deterring the acquisition of large fortunes at death will be
effectuated.' This would also remove the cause of excessive litigation
106. It has sometimes been doubted that the Federal Government would have the
power to require its estate tax to be apportioned among all the distributees. See REPORTS
TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 160. But see
New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
Does the exclusive power of states to control the devolution of property at death
prevent federal apportionment provisions? See note 7 supra. Certainly a tax ultimately
placed upon a specific legatee or beneficiary diminishes, to the extent of the tax, the
right to inherit or receive, but this is a burden cast upon the recipient and not upon the
power of the state to regulate.
"[T]he fallacy which underlies the proposition contended for [that a federal legacy
tax ought to be declared unconstitutional] is the assumption that the tax on the trans-
mission or receipt of property occasioned at death is imposed on the exclusive power of
the state to regulate the devolution bf property upon death. The thing forming the uni-
versal subject of taxation, upon which inheritance and legacy taxes rest, is the transmis-
sion or receipt, and not the right existing to regulate." Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41,
59 (1900). It is generally conceded that the power to levy taxes includes the power to
specify the persons ultimately responsible for payment. See 42 COL. L. REV. 708, 709
(1942). See also 9 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 528 (1942).
107. The thesis of this Note is not to endorse the apparent purpose of Congress to
cut down enormous fortunes at death, but rather to assure a proper allocation of the
estate tax burden consistent with Congressional intent and congruous with the equities
of all persons affected. A repeal of the federal estate tax law in its entirety deserves
consideration, however, as an alternative solution to the problem. Indeed, there is much
merit in the contention that the deterrence of the accumulation of large fortunes at death
is not a desirable result and that Congress ought to abandon the death tax field, leaving
it entirely to the states.
Those who advocate leaving the death tax exclusively to the states advance, inter alia,
the following arguments: (1) The history of the estate tax indicates that its use by the
Federal Government has been primarily for temporary war purposes, and since it was
developed by and rightly belongs to the states, the latter should have exclusive power
except in emergencies. See Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on General
Revenue Revision, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 1615 (1953). See also discussion in note 7 supra.
(2) The estate tax has a disproportionate importance in the federal revenue field. Os-
good, supra note 20, at 248. (3) The tax must be paid essentially out of capital which, if
dissipated through excessively high rates, becomes lost in benefit to future generations.
Id. at 252. (4) It has a particularly adverse effect upon small businesses in that it im-
pairs incentive and discourages the natural desire to perpetuate successful family enter-
prises. By forcing the wealthy to seek comparatively safe, liquid investments in order
to provide for heavy taxes that will be imposed on their estates at death, the trend to-
ward concentration of economic power in the hands of a few is accentuated. See Hear-
ings, supra at 1609, 1613, 1619. For an amusing but persuasive criticism of the federal
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from which has evolved a host of legal fictions, not necessarily doing
justice to testator's true intent. Second, there should be an appropriate
provision making the insurer liable in those instances where reimburse-
ment cannot be had from the insurance beneficiary. It might seem some-
what unfair to encumber every contract of insurance with such a clause;
yet, if the Federal Government were to have a right against the insurer
to which the executor could be subrogated, prompt payment and certain
apportionment of the tax would result. At least, the possibility that either
the Federal Government or the executor would be placed in the position
of a "hat-in-hand" creditor who must await satisfaction of his just claim
by attachment or sequestration of the stated installments under arrange-
ments made by decedent during his lifetime would be obviated."' 8 Third,
the statute should spell out the treatment to be given to the surviving
spouse's share, charities, and other interests qualifying under the deduc-
tion provisions." 9
The desirable features of such a federal apportionment statute are
three-fold. The apparent social motive of Congress would be more apt
to be fulfilled. Such a statute would continue to allow the Federal
Government to avoid involvement in the administration of estates by
leaving it to the executor to obtain the proper pro-rated shares of tax due
from the respective beneficiaries. Finally, through certainty in the law,
the estate planner will no longer need fear that injustice will be done to
any of the legatees or beneficiaries through the operation of the fictions
developed both under the present federal act and under the state appor-
tionment acts. The testator will know that the tax will be pro-rated and
can plan his estate accordingly. The failure of Congress to act can only
tax, see Thornburg, The Happy Hunting Ground of the Infernal Revenue Bureau, 22
NOTRE DAME LAW. 237 (1947).
On the other hand it is urged that experience has shown that the federal tax has
actually stimulated collections in the state through INT. REV. CODE § 2011, allowing credit
for state death taxes, and that interstate tax competition would result from federal with-
drawal from the field. See REPORTS TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE,
supra note 7, at 149-152. See also Hearings, supra note 20, at 38. Furthermore, as one
writer points out, "Death taxes are here to stay; they have passed through the growing-
pain stage. Many of the dire economic consequences that were trotted out in bogey-man
style in opposition to them, have not materialized as yet on the American scene." ANDER-
SON, TAXATION AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 256 (1951).
108. The problem then arises as to whether the amounts of the respective payments
should be reduced or should be made constant with the number of such payments being
diminished. Polisher, Proration of Federal Estate Tax Among Life Insurance Benefi-
ciaries, 50 DICK. L. REV. 1, 3 (1945). The best answer appears to be in allowing the re-
maining corpus to be the basis for actuarially readjusted payments to the beneficiary. See
it re Scott's Estate, 158 Misc. 481, 286 N.Y. Supp. 138 (Surr. Ct. 1936).
109. The statute should also clarify the treatment to be given penalty and interest on
delinquent payments and temporary interests upon apportionment. See discussion in
note 103 supra.
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lead to prolongation of an already thoroughly confused treatment of the
problem of who shall bear the burden of a federally imposed estate tax.
THE CORPORATE CREDITOR AND LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTIONS
ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF CAPITAL
An ever-present policy conflict is involved in the enactment of statutes
restricting the dissipation of corporate capital since an attempt must be
made to compromise the interest of creditors in the complete satisfaction
of their claims and the interest of corporations in managerial freedom.
Comparatively recent state legislation limiting the reduction of capital1
and the disposition of the resulting surplus,2 not only has achieved greater
protection for the creditor3 of a corporation, but has also made provision
for the need of the corporation for a flexible capital amount.4
The corporate creditor has available all of the safeguards provided
by law for creditors of individuals.5 The creditor is thus protected
1. The term, "capital," in this note, does not refer to "capital" as defined by
economists, (assets used to acquire additional wealth); nor does the term refer to the
proprietorship account used by the accountant. See HATFIELD, SURPLUS AND DIVIDENDS
3 (1948).
Capital is used in the sense of "legal capital" and means that "... amount which
measures the margin of net assets or value which is to be retained in the business as
against withdrawals in favor of the shareholders." BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 206
(Rev. Ed. 1946). See also Bailey, Safeguarding the Claims of Creditors, 4 BAYLOR L.
REV. 470, 473-474 (1952).
"Capital," when used in the phrase "distribution of capital," refers to a distribution
of assets.
For other definitions of capital, stated capital, legal capital, and capital stock, and
discussions of the legal capital concept, see BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 206, 207, 227,
and 266 (Rev. Ed. 1946); BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 162-163 (1948) ; 11 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIONS §§ 5079, 5080 (Perm. Ed. 1943) ; Bailey, supra at 473; Bonbright, The Dangers of
Shares Without Par Value, 24 COL. L. REV. 449, 450 (1924); Hills, Model Corporation
Act, 48 HARv. L. REv. 1334, 1359 (1935).
2. A reduction surplus will arise when the impairment of capital, if any, at the time
of the reduction of capital, is less than the amount by which the capital is reduced.
3. The creditor considered in this note is the general, unsecured, trade creditor. Con-
sideration of creditor protection involves the ability of the corporation to satisfy his
claim out of income, the satisfaction that the creditor may receive from a sale of the
assets on liquidation, and the benefits accruing to the creditor from a reorganization of
the corporation.
4. For comprehensive summaries of the methods by which capital may be reduced,
see 1 TEx. L. & LEGIs. 276, 280 (1947) ; Note, 44 A.L.R. 11, 20 (1926).
It should be noted that three distinct steps are involved in each reduction procedure:
(1) determination by the directors and shareholders of the amount of capital as reduced,
(2) the actual reduction of the capital stock, and (3) the distribution of assets to share-
holders. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 266 (Rev. Ed. 1946).
5. Warren, Safeguarding the Creditors of Corporations, 36 HARV. L. REV. 509
(1923).
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